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Abstract
This paper aims to shed light on the role
played by purposefulness in Peirce’s account
of thought by means of a comparison with
Kant’s regulative principles. Purposefulness,
as an orientation toward an end involved in a
thought process, is distinguished from pur-
posiveness, as conformity to an end. Peirce’s
architectonic, cosmology, and theory of nat-
ural classes are briefly analyzed in light of
these concepts. Then, a comparison between
Peirce’s esthetic ideal and regulative hopes
and Kant’s regulative ideas and principle of
purposiveness is undertaken. This compari-
son, while allowing us to find a solution for
some difficulties, especially some regarding
Peirce’s esthetics, shows how purposefulness
is far more important for the American
thinker. Thus, purposefulness and purpo-
siveness turn out to be primarily regulative
principles of our thought. As such, they
allow us to identify a transcendental level in
Peirce’s philosophy, avoiding the inconsisten-
cies that have been attributed to Karl-Otto
Apel’s account.
Keywords: Charles S. Peirce, Immanuel
Kant, Friedrich Schiller, Purposefulness,
Purposiveness, Synthetic reasoning, Esthetic
Ideal, Regulative Hopes, Regulative Ideas,
Transcendental Philosophy
Introduction2
From his own day to ours, the Kantian
character of Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy
has been recognized and (in recent decades)
documented, so it would seem to be super-
fluous to do so once again. In a general
manner, the relevance of concepts like final-
ity, purpose, and end to an understanding
of some of his most fundamental doctrines
(especially his pragmatism or pragmati-
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cism) has also been widely recognized. What is, however, lacking in the
secondary literature on Peirce is not so much a detailed, systematic
account of the role that purposefulness plays in securing the unity of his
thought3 but such an account developed in specific reference to Kant’s
critical project. If Peirce were interpreted in this light, we would obtain
a deeper insight into the (methodo)-logical root that grounds the dif-
ferent shapes that the orientation toward an end assumes in his theo-
retical undertaking. That is, nothing less than the diverse forms of
human purposefulness, as envisioned by Peirce himself, would come
into sharper focus.
There are certainly many respects in which Peirce can be considered
Kantian or non-Kantian, and his conception of purposefulness is
undoubtedly one of those. His purpose-oriented account of natural
classes is deeply inspired by Aristotle. Moreover, the development of
Darwinian evolutionism was surely a relevant influence on his renewed
interest for end-oriented processes in nature. However, I think that a
comparison with Kant can help us understand those respects in which
purposefulness is logically relevant; that is, it can help us grasp those
respects in which purposefulness is an essential principle for the process
of reasoning. 
The warrant for interpreting Peirce’s philosophy in light of purpose-
fulness is provided by Peirce himself, insofar as he chooses the word
pragmatism for the connection between rational cognitions and rational
purposes that it recommends. His vindication of using pragmatism as a
word to identify his doctrine (rather than practicalism), is based on the
Kantian distinction between pragmatisch and praktisch.4 Pragmatisch,
for him, identifies a dimension of thought in “relation to some definite
human purpose.”5 This makes the pragmatic virtually synonymous with
the purposeful, where the purposeful is not bound to selfish ends, but
consists in an intersubjective and general process that makes signs grow
in a social undertaking. It is just in the tasks of highlighting the gener-
ality involved in Peirce’s idea of purposefulness and of distinguishing it
from any utilitarian view of purposes that a comparison with some con-
cepts of Kant, developed in the 2nd Appendix and in the Architectonic
of the first Critique and in the third Critique, becomes useful and not
banal.6 While such a comparison has to some extent been undertaken,
more needs to be done—in particular, we need to move beyond the
restrictive focus on regulative ideas (as important as a proper under-
standing of such ideas is).7
For our purposes, I will define, at the outset, purposefulness as orien-
tation toward an end involved in a thought process, distinguishing it
from the more specific concept of purposiveness, with which I will iden-
tify the Kantian idea of Zweckmäâigkeit, that is conformity to an end.8
It is impossible to examine all the different but arguably interrelated
senses in which the connection to a purpose is both a theme treated in
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depth by Peirce and a factor giving direction to his endeavors. Hence,
what I hope to accomplish in this paper is simply to identify the
methodological root that lies at the basis of all the different shapes that
the orientation toward an end gains in Peirce’s philosophy as a whole.9
As we will see, it is here that we find the means to understand Peirce’s
account of natural teleology. In doing so, it should become clear that
Peirce develops more fully than Kant the importance of purposefulness.
He does so in a way that highlights both his affinity to, and differences
from, his predecessor: the concept of purposefulness provides us with
the key to understanding the hypothetical and self-corrective character of
Peirce’s philosophy as a whole. While the possibility of limitless self-
correction is recognized by Kant, the need for a mode of thinking other
than the merely hypothetical is at the basis of Kant’s project. Kant goes
so far as to assert in the Preface to the first edition of the first Critique:
“Everything . . . which bears any manner of resemblance to an hypoth-
esis is to be treated as contraband; it is not to be put up for sale even at
the lowest price, but forthwith confiscated, immediately upon detec-
tion” (KrV, A XV). What could be farther from the self-understanding
of an experimentalist, especially one who characterized one of his most
famous doctrines as the “logic of abduction” (that is, the logic of the
formation of hypotheses)? From Kant, Peirce inherited the ideal of
human reason holding itself accountable in a strict, severe sense not
only for its claims about reality but also for its ideals, goals, and pur-
poses. The Kantian account of knowledge demands, at least in the
empirical employment of human concepts, limitless adjustments,
including inevitable self-correction. 
In order to support these claims, I will discuss, first, Peirce’s architec-
tonic as a fulfillment of our orientation toward an end and, moreover (if
we limit our attention to logic and the sciences more abstract than it), as
an attempt to identify the fundamental elements of thought which allow
us to address a question that, like Kant in the third Critique, he takes to
be of central importance. That is, how can we, starting from experience,
obtain a synthetic knowledge of the empirical world? Though the rela-
tionship between these two concerns may not be immediately obvious,
it becomes so when we realize that the possibility of such synthesis
depends ultimately upon the presence of purposefulness. But, in partic-
ular, Peirce’s answer to this question makes use of his notions of esthetic
ideal and regulative hopes.10 These notions themselves and their deploy-
ment in this context, however, are enhanced by being connected to the
Kantian concept of regulative ideas and the equally central Kantian
principle of purposiveness. Yet this is not all. In their distinctively Kant-
ian form, these concepts assist Peirce in realizing his own philosophical
purposes helping us in finding a consistent formulation of the esthetic
ideal and regulative hopes. While Kant assists Peirce in this respect,
Peirce in the end goes beyond Kant precisely in reference to the topics
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under consideration. The result of this is not a rejection of Kant but a
radical transformation of the transcendental project. This transforma-
tion is, however, quite different than the one identified by the foremost
contemporary proponents of Peirce as a transcendental pragmatist, most
notably Karl-Otto Apel. Hence, I will in conclusion not only identify
the sense in which even the mature Peirce was engaged in a “transcen-
dental” project but also dissociate this sense from that of Apel.
The Fundamental Orientation Toward an End
Recall that, for our purposes, purposefulness is to be understood as an
orientation toward an end involved in a thought process. As such, it
provides us the means to understand Peirce’s own architectonic project,
which I will suggest should be understood as a self-understanding of
thought in which we are both using and showing the synthetic and
hypothetical structure of our systems of signs. 
It is hardly necessary to remind readers of Peirce that he was commit-
ted to constructing philosophy architectonically (CP 1.176–178). Even if
the Kantian inheritance in the use of this word is generally acknowl-
edged, more than often the implications of this inheritance are neglected
(KrV, A 832–851 B 860–879).11 Thus, the relationships among the dif-
ferent sciences are understood by means of Auguste Comte’s model, in
which a science borrows its principles from the more abstract science and
its contents from the more concrete one (EP 2:258, 458).12 I certainly do
not want to say that this interpretation of Peirce is incorrect, for I would
be flying in the face of too much textual evidence, but I do want to stress
that we lose something very important if we limit ourselves to this pattern
viewing Peirce’s architectonic exclusively in reference to Comte’s model.
In relying solely on Comte’s schema to represent what Peirce means by
architectonic, we forget the holistic picture of a system that Peirce shares
with Kant. Thus, Peirce, after having linked the cosmological to the
architectonic character of philosophy, claimed:
To the cosmological or secular character of philosophy (to which, as
closely connected, Kant with his unfailing discernment joins the cir-
cumstance that philosophy is a thing that has to grow by the fission
of minute parts and not by accretion) is due the necessity of planning
it out from the beginning. [CP 1.177]13
If we have to construct our philosophy by the fission of minute parts,
we have to possess first of all the idea of the whole, which must guide
us in the organization of the elements. Without some idea of a possi-
ble whole of knowledge, human inquiry can never be anything more
than blind groping and perhaps even less than this—spasmodic exer-
tions now in this direction, now in that. With a search for the whole
(i.e., with a directive purpose), however, human inquiry becomes a
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deliberate undertaking, a self-conscious and self-critical project with a
ceaselessly self-corrective future. The priority of the idea of a possible
whole is the heart of the Kantian architectonic and is immediately
linked with purposefulness.14 Even if Peirce offers what is deliberately
(or conscientiously) limited to an architectonic of experimental rea-
son, not one of pure reason, the inspiration and, to some extent, the
form of this system owe more to Kant than Comte. Thus, both for
Peirce and Kant we construct our systems making the form of the
whole an end to pursue. Accordingly, in the first Critique Kant wrote:
In accordance with reason’s legislative prescriptions, our diverse
modes of knowledge must not be permitted to be a mere rhapsody,
but must form a system. Only so can they further the essential ends
of reason. By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes
of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by
reason of the form of a whole. [KrV, A 832 B860]15
It is a vague anticipation of the whole that drives us to the construc-
tion of a system; an idea that functions like an indeterminate end which
does not hold in itself the actual relationship of the parts before their con-
crete emergence. “For this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which
the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognizable even under micro-
scopic observation” (KrV, A 834 B 862). This is to say that the directions
in which our knowledge will eventually move, the forms that it will his-
torically assume, are not predetermined by the presence of the idea of a
possible whole. We need to consider the contents of our actual knowl-
edge to develop a definite whole suitable to account for them. As a con-
sequence, the definite whole which constitutes our result is not
anticipated in any way in the idea of a possible whole that guides us in
our search for this reaching. Thus, the operative presence of an essential
end of human reason at the very outset of its self-critical employment
does not prevent the fully developmental and dynamical character of the
architectonic itself. If this is so (and there is very strong reason to believe
it is), Peirce’s claim that we have only historically bounded totalities is
compatible with the claim that we have to pursue the shape of the whole
so as to obtain a determinate ordering, and I think this is the way in
which we have to understand his architectonic.16
The architectonic is thus at once an instance of a progressive organ-
ization of our thought in order to conform our ideal of knowledge and,
if we limit our attention to logic and the sciences that it presupposes, a
picture of the fundamental elements that are present in our thought
among which this orientation itself finds a place. As a consequence, the
purposefulness involved in the semiotic process constitutes the ground
to understand the orientation toward a congruent representation expe-
rienced in the architectonic.17 Granting that, I do believe that we can
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find a solid basis to understand not only all the expression of the orien-
tation toward an end involved in a thought process, but even the teleo-
logical tendency in real objects postulated by Peirce. 
Is it not true that Peirce holds that the orientation toward an end of
our inferences and of the process of inquiry is only an aspect of the gen-
eral growth of reason which joins together thought and nature (CP
8.256)? This question could hide some essential differences in the way in
which Peirce accounts for the end-orientation of thought and of the
world as a whole (our thought included). But it raises another question.
That is, why does Peirce need to give a common account of thought and
nature by means of the orientation toward an end? I think that, for Peirce,
we do not have to explain our thinking as a phenomenon of the process
of evolution that we find in the world;18 on the contrary, the process of
evolution of the world remains an explanatory hypothesis to account for
the achievements of our thought (CP 1.487).19 It means that the orien-
tation toward an end that we postulate in cosmology finds its ground in
the purposive character of the semiotic process. Thus, it is in the norma-
tive sciences that we discover the roots of the explanatory hypothesis
developed in Peirce’s metaphysics. If I am right, this allows the employ-
ment of a comparison with Kant even to approach Peirce’s treatment of
teleology in cosmology, as far as we have to understand this process only
in analogy to the principle that we encounter in the normative sciences.
Obviously, it is not possible to ascribe any objective value to purposeful-
ness by the simple postulation of this analogy. So, when Peirce tries to
show that there are real tendencies toward ends in nature, he also has to
point out some empirical evidence. It is true that for Peirce we might
reach an answer to the question if this teleology is real or not, whereas for
Kant it is not, but, until the evolutionary process functions as an explana-
tory hypothesis, we have to find his ground in the conformity with the
semiotic process of generalization. If we remind ourselves of our defini-
tion of purposefulness and purposiveness—–whereby the former means
an orientation toward an end involved in a thought process and the latter
a conformity to an end—–we can see how the architectonic deals essen-
tially with purposefulness, while cosmology, being the postulation of a
conformity between reality and the purposefulness involved in thought,
is actually an instance of purposiveness. 
The same thing can be said for the concept of natural classifica-
tion.20 Kant holds that in respect of some objects we are compelled to
use the concept of final causation to understand their being, but we
cannot ascribe a real value to this final cause (KU 239–249). This is
precisely the point in which Peirce’s philosophy departs the most from
that of Kant. For Peirce every law, even the mechanical ones, functions
as a final cause, and it really governs the facts. Thus, we can have only
one natural classification (CP 1.275). This difference is a very impor-
tant one. It coincides with Peirce’s axiom not to block the road of
inquiry. In other words, if the concepts that we use for the knowledge
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of objects involve a kind of purposiveness and prove to be appropriate
to our pragmatic interaction with those objects, why do we need to
bound the purposefulness in our conceptual implementations? I do not
think that we need to stress this important difference, as it is widely
accepted. For our concerns, it is more important to distinguish two
issues. First, the fact that for Peirce every law functions as a final cause
broadens the boundary of the use of purposiveness with respect to
Kant. Second, if we look at the natural classification in the context of
Peirce’s fallibilism, we can see how we can approach, but never reach,
the “true” natural classification. This is to say that the purposive nature
of every concept that we use to know the world can be distinguished
from the question of the reality of this purpose. Only the ultimate
answer reached by the inquiry would correspond exactly to the real
class that operates in the world. Indeed, we can differentiate two levels
in Peirce’s teleological account of natural classes: the former heuristic,
which postulates a conformity between the way in which symbols and
the laws that those symbols represent relate to their instances and fall
under our definition of purposiveness, the latter real, which treats the
universe as a purposeful organism and is opposed to Kant.21
In the same way as in cosmology, in natural classification the postu-
lation of a real orientation toward an end for the facts which fall under
a law rests upon an analogy between the way we relate signs and the
principle which guides the organization of the universe. We can thus
distinguish the question of the purposefulness necessarily involved in
our class-concept from the question of its reality. If this is true, we can
see how a reference to Kant can help us clarify the former question, as
far as his concern is to show how we must use the idea of teleology in
our knowledge without the right of giving it a real value.
I hope I have succeeded in vindicating a unifying approach to the
many ways purposefulness takes in Peirce’s thought as a fundamental
development and reconfiguration of some problems faced by Kant as
well. This is possible only focusing on the normative science as the core
of Peirce’s notions of purpose, final cause and end, and on semiosis as
the teleological process of the growth of signs that forces Peirce to think
in terms of orientation toward an end even in other fields of inquiry.
Having suggested how the root of every instantiation of the idea of pur-
posefulness lies in the architectonical and synthetic picture that Peirce
uses to represent our thought, it is now time to analyze in detail how
this semiotic process works.
How Are Synthetical Judgments Possible?
I am now going to introduce a fundamental problem which accompa-
nied Peirce throughout much of his career. We can find it in the early vin-
dications of the method of induction,22 or in the late appeal to instinct to
explicate our power of abduction.23 This problem concerns the possibil-
ity of the synthesis, the possibility of the growth of knowledge. Even
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though both induction and abduction are, for Peirce, synthetic, I think it
is in abduction that we face the issue in all its fullness as far as it is the only
reasoning that can introduce a new idea, or use a past idea in a new con-
text, while induction can only extend the value of an assertion upon some
members of a class to the whole class (EP 1:189). Thus, only abduction
can introduce a totally new class, or change our representation of it in
order to introduce a new member. It is for this reason that our concern
regarding synthetic reasoning will focus on abduction. Approaching this
issue by means of the words of Peirce is particularly fruitful because he
states it in a direct critical relation to Kant which, as we will see, justifies
our looking to the third Critique.
According to Kant, the central question of philosophy is “How are
synthetical judgments a priori possible?” But antecedently to this
comes the question how synthetical judgments in general, and still
more generally, how synthetical reasoning is possible at all. [EP 1:78]
First of all, it is important to notice that Peirce wrote these words in
1869. Indeed, he formulated very early the problem that we are explor-
ing. Accusing Kant of not having first answered the question about the
general possibility of the synthesis, Peirce is touching a very essential
point of his position in respect to the German thinker. For Peirce, one
of the biggest mistakes Kant made was to maintain the strong distinc-
tion between feeling, as passivity, and understanding, as activity24. It is
the strong notion of understanding as activity that allows Kant to draw
from logic the table of a priori categories and to characterize them as
something completely knowable independently of our particular expe-
rience. Subsequently, he vindicates the application of these categories to
experience in general by means of their reference to the a priori forms
of space and time. After having divided the two worlds of feeling and
understanding, he holds a necessary application of the latter to the for-
mer without giving an explanation of how this mediation is possible,
said Peirce. The first question would have been: how can we use our
general concept to judge a particular feeling? The Peircean answer to
this question lies in the mediating function of the sign. The sign has the
ability to connect a singular occurrence with a general term. Peirce saw
in the Kantian notion of schema an attempt to account for this medi-
ating function, an attempt that, for him, came too late.
His doctrine of schemata can only have been an afterthought, an
addition to his system after it was substantially complete. For if the
schemata had been considered early enough, they would have over-
grown his whole work. [CP 1.35]
Thus, for Peirce, the main error of Kant was not having considered
synthesis in general as the ground from which to build his whole system.
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But if we look at the third Critique, I think that we can recognize the
process of synthesis as its essential concern, as far as “the power of judg-
ment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained
under the universal” (KU, 66). The power of judgment is precisely the
faculty that brings together feelings and concepts. It is a principle that
enables us to use a general rule to apprehend a particular fact.25
We can see how far this analogy goes if we consider for a moment
Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters. Peirce’s appreciation of the play-drive lies pre-
cisely in its mediating function between the passivity of our feelings and
the activity of our reason. The first two drives that compose a human soul
are the sensuous and the formal one. “If the first drive only furnishes cases,
this second one gives laws” (Schiller, 1967, p. 81). Considered separately
these two features of the human soul cannot work. The first would
reduce it to matter, without a principle of the unity of matter, and the
second would fall in a pure empty formalism (Schiller, 1967, 77). The
function of the play-drive is thus to open up a path for the rising of our
activity in the middle of our passive apprehensions. The play-drive coin-
cides here with the aesthetic state: A state in which a person is not yet in
the pure formal state of the law, while nonetheless free from the pure pas-
sivity of perception. It is a pure state of freedom, aside from the material
and the formal determinations. It is a state in which we experience form
before a determinate form of reason is at hand. There is something like an
indeterminate grasp of form at the level of feelings. What is important to
notice is that this grasping of form at the level of feeling allows reason to
enter the sphere of sensibility. “Through the aesthetic modulation of the
psyche, then, the autonomy of reason is already broken up within the
domain of sense itself” (Schiller, 1967, p. 163). We find here a similarity
between feeling and reason as far as the form of reason is felt in an inde-
terminate manner in perception.
We have reached a point very close to Kant’s discussion of the judg-
ments of taste. In this kind of judgment, for Kant, we feel a pleasure
thanks to the affinity between the form of the object that we experience
and the general form of our understanding.
If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension of the form of an
object of intuition without a relation of this to a concept for a deter-
minate cognition, then the representation is thereby related not to the
object, but solely to the subject, and pleasure can express nothing but
its suitability to the cognitive faculties that are in play in the reflect-
ing power of judgment, insofar as they are in play, and thus merely a
subjective formal purposiveness of the object. [KU, pp 75–76]
It is easy to see how Schiller inherits his concept of an aesthetic state
and of play from a reading of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judg-
ment.26 What interests Peirce in Schiller’s letters, and what Kant
attempts to solve in his third Critique, is precisely a basic problem
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regarding the ways of connecting our concepts and rules to our expe-
rience.27 In general, the power of judgment is a faculty that allows us
to connect our concepts and our feelings by means of a resemblance
between the two. But it is in its reflecting form that the power of judg-
ment discloses all its synthetic force as an a priori principle for our a
posteriori experience.28 In fact, the reflecting power of judgment gives
us a principle to search for a rule which enables us judging a surprising
percept.29 Here the question how are synthetical judgments possible?
gains its full importance, for what the synthesis has to bring about is a
completely new rule.30 What is at issue here is still the need of an activ-
ity intervening before the possession of a determinate rule and capable
of finding it by means of the similarity between the facts at end and the
rule we need. 
It is useful here to remember that for Peirce abduction is the only
synthetic reasoning that enables us to discover a new idea (EP 2:216)
and that it works finding similarities between an imaginative represen-
tation and a general one.31 As Peirce put it, “This synthesis suggesting
a new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. It is recognized that
the phenomena are like, i.e. constitute an Icon of, a replica of a general
conception, or Symbol” (EP 2:287).
Now we know that to bring about a synthetic concept we need a
process capable of acknowledging similarities between the form of our
apprehension and the form of our symbols.32 The call for an interme-
diate state between determinate passivity and determinate activity is
thus a common problem that Kant, Schiller and Peirce face in different
but interrelated contexts. Having individuated the common problem
in the need for a synthetic process of mediation that allows one to
obtain a new concept departing from not yet organized representations,
we have now to analyze which elements play an active role in this gen-
erative semiotic process. 
Hoping for the Admirable
To answer the question how a progressive organization of our thought
is possible from a Peircean perspective, we need to analyze two essential
concepts: the esthetic ideal and the regulative hopes. As we will see Peirce
needs an esthetic ideal that enables us to anticipate vaguely the form of
thirdness which has to guide our inquiry. On the other hand, this guide
is not enough to start the process of inquiry. We have to hope that we
can fulfill the vague ideal that we are searching for.
The Esthetic Ideal and the Regulative Ideas
It was only after 1902 that Peirce became thoroughly conscious of the
self-corrective character of semeiotic, inserting it in his classification of
the normative sciences together with ethics and esthetics (CP 1.575–
584; 2.196–200).33 The normative sciences are theoretical sciences
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because they do not give us any prescription about how to think and to
act. They only describe the fundamental purposive character of our
thought, will, and feeling. In the triad, esthetics plays a fundamental
role, as far as it gives us a grasp of the admirable per se which grounds
the orientation toward an end of all of the normative sciences. Thus, we
will focus our attention on the science of the esthetic ideal given its fun-
damental role in the synthetic process of inquiry.34
After 1902 Peirce gave many contrasting descriptions of esthetics and
of the ideals with which it deals. For example, in the Minute Logic of
1902 he described the object of esthetics as something that we can feel
in its immediate presence, without finding any duality in it (CP 2.199).
In contrast, in a 1906 draft for a paper entitled “The Basis of Pragmati-
cism,” he held that esthetic good and bad are closely connected to the
secondary feelings of pleasure and pain as kinds of attraction and repul-
sion, indeed as kinds of action (EP 2:379). I think that we have to look
at these as many attempts to resolve some difficult issues that Peirce
faced when he searched to give a systematic account of esthetics in the
normative sciences. We can list the problems as follows:
- He needed a science of the ideal that grounds the process of self-
control and of the growth of reason;
- He was convinced that esthetics, in some ways, deals with feeling;
- He did not want to give a psychological account of logic ground-
ing it in immediate feelings;
- He wanted to find a dualistic character in esthetics, so as to insert
it rightfully into the normative sciences.
The movement from one to another illustration of the character of
the admirable per se coincides with the different emphasis that Peirce
placed on one or the other of these problems. Indeed, I do not think
that we can find a solution in Peirce. We can only look at the paths that
his argumentation takes, so as to find some suggestions for a solution,
perhaps with the aid of Kant. We can find a confirmation that this is
the case if we have a look to Peirce’s unpublished papers. In a manu-
script written in 1910 he identified pain as a pure feeling, contrasting
his formulation in “The Basis of Pragmatism” and preventing a picture
of linear evolution for his account of esthetics (MS 649.37). In the
same paper he noticed that “Pleasure and Pain do not, in themselves,
carry any sound Reason for acting one way, influential as they are in the
purely brutal mode” (MS 649.29). That is to say that pleasure and pain
cannot constitute any ground for the reasonableness of our ideals, an
aspect so fundamental in what Peirce was looking for. Moreover, Peirce
doubted the position of esthetics between the Normative Sciences even
after 1903. In 1905 he made esthetics a branch of ethics (MS 1334.36)
and in 1911 he hesitated to call the first branch of the Normative Sci-
ences esthetics (MS 673.13).
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We might take the description of esthetics that he gives us in “The
Basis of Pragmatism” (EP 2:361–397) as his final position.35 True, it
gives us a solution to the latter two problems listed above. Peirce did
want to distinguish his position from that of Sigwart and the ‘German
logicians’ (EP 2:166–169, 252–255). Logic cannot rest upon a feeling
of logicality which does not allow any distinction between good and bad
reasoning. This argument asserts that we hold a reasoning as true so far
as we feel it is logical. If afterward we criticize it, we can do so only
because we feel the logicality of another reasoning. Thus, we have no
criterion by which to assert the truth or the falsity of an argument given
that its acceptance or critique rests upon the feeling of the person that
holds it, so that when two people hold two different positions, we have
no means to choose between the two (EP 2:244).
Peirce tried to move away from this position asserting that pleasure
and pain are not immediate feelings but secondary ones which have to
do with the attractiveness or the repulsiveness of a primary feeling (EP
2:189–190, 379). This position allowed him to give a dualistic account
of esthetics which vindicates its location in the normative sciences,
avoiding a foundation dealing with immediate feelings. But there are
two problems in this position which, I think, indicate that it is not the
best formulation for Peirce’s needs. First, an account of esthetic pleasure
and pain based upon the distinction between what is attractive and
what is repulsive can hardly give us an idea of what is admirable per se
as an end to pursue. Second, explaining esthetic experience as a sort of
action, we lose an important feature of what Peirce was looking for: the
possibility of discovering a similarity between a non-symbolical appre-
hension and the form of thirdness and lawfulness.
What Peirce needs in his discussion of esthetics is the possibility to
anticipate the lawfulness of thirdness in feeling. He needs a vague rep-
resentation of the reasonableness that we search in inquiry grasped at
the level of a qualitative indeterminate sign: “The one thing whose
admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is Reason itself compre-
hended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it” (EP 2:255).
It is precisely for this last image of the admirable that the dualistic
account based upon the distinction between what is attractive and what
is repulsive cannot account. In esthetics Peirce needs a way to ground
our inquiry and behavior upon an ideal represented at the level of feel-
ing, an organized feeling that is totally different from the  immediate
one which grounds logic for Sigwart. The admirable has to give us a
vague idea of a system of knowledge that rests with our inquiry to ful-
fill. It is only after this admirable ideal has been grasped that the
dichotomy of the attractive and the repulsive can make sense represent-
ing something that fits or does not fit it. Anything can be considered
good or bad, beautiful or ugly, desirable or undesirable, only in refer-
ence to an ideal that it conforms or not (MS 310.11–12; 649.37–38).36
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But in so far as selfish ideals are excluded from the scope of esthetics,
this ideal must be the unique one that is admirable by any sound
rational being, that is Reason itself. Taking the opposition between
pleasure and pain as the founding division of esthetics would mean
missing the main role of esthetics in the schema of the normative sci-
ences: the individuation of an end independently from any contingent
consideration tied to a particular interest. It is for that reason that
Peirce speaks about an ideal admirable independent of any ulterior rea-
son (EP 2:142, 201, 253, 255, 260; MS 1334.38–39; 602.10–11;
633.5). As a result, I think we can distinguish the imaginative grasping
of the ideal, in which no consideration has to interfere, and the pleas-
ure that we feel in the contemplation of an object which depends on the
relationship between that object and the reasonable ideal. Using our
distinction between purposefulness and purposiveness, we can say that
when Peirce is talking about the admirable per se he is referring to the
former concept as the end that grounds our generalizing tendency. On
the contrary, when he refers to esthetic enjoyment he has in mind a con-
formity to that ideal, approaching the Kantian idea of purposiveness. 
I think that now we can seek Kant’s aid in order to clarify the prob-
lem at hand. The aesthetic judgment upon the beautiful in nature gives
us pleasure as far as we feel a similarity, a harmony between the form of
the object apprehended in the imagination and the form of the under-
standing as a general faculty.
Since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact
that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest
on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its
freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness, thus on a feeling
that allows the object to be judged in accordance with the purposive-
ness of the representation . . . for the promotion of the faculty of cog-
nition in its free play; and taste, as a subjective power of judgment,
contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under con-
cepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or representations (i.e. imagina-
tion) under the faculty of concepts (i.e. understanding), insofar as the
former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its lawfulness.
[KU, 167–168]
What Kant is describing is a harmony between the form of the
objects in our apprehension and the faculty of concepts in general,
before any particular concept is used. Kant’s analysis of the judgments
of taste is useful to understand what Peirce is looking for as far as he
needs an account of pleasure which is brought about by an experience
of the form of thirdness at the level of feelings:
it seems to me that while in esthetic enjoyment we attend to the total-
ity of Feeling . . . yet it is a sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that
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here is a feeling that one can comprehend, a reasonable feeling. I do
not succeed in saying exactly what it is, but it is a consciousness
belonging to the category of Representation though representing
something in the Category of Quality of Feeling. [EP 2:190; see also
MS 310.9, 11–12]
In Kant’s aesthetic judgment we feel a pleasure in so far as we find a
similarity with the form of our lawfulness in the form of our apprehen-
sion. Likewise, in Peirce’s esthetic enjoyment we feel pleasure for the
presence of the form of thirdness in the quality of a representation
given at the level of feeling; we feel pleasure for the occurrence of the
form of reasonableness in the way in which our feelings present them-
selves. In other words, we feel pleasure because we experience a similar-
ity between the order of feelings and the vague idea of the admirable
per se.37
As a result, when Peirce refers to esthetic enjoyment he is dealing with
purposiveness, insofar as he is treating a conformity between a represen-
tation and the ideal of our reason. To the contrary, when he is searching
for a way to identify the ideal in itself, the admirable per se, he is look-
ing for a grasp of the form of thirdness at the level of qualitative repre-
sentations capable of offering us a ground for the purposefulness
involved in our thought.38 He never held this as his definitive solution
because, worried as he was by the danger of identification of the
esthetic ideal with Sigwart’s immediate feelings, he never succeeded in
clarifying the difference between purposefulness and purposiveness.
Having seen how much we lose in the dualistic account of esthetics, I
think now we have enough arguments to distinguish the qualitative
vague grasping of thirdness from the foundation of logic upon immedi-
ate feelings.39 Sigwart’s position is totally different from Peirce’s so far as
it uses the feeling of logicality to vindicate the value of an argument. In
Sigwart’s hands feelings become the only possible ground of justification
for any logical process. To the contrary, what Peirce is searching for is not
a ground to validate logical reasonings, but a vague ideal to stimulate a
course of inference—an ideal grasped in feeling that induces us to
develop a reasonableness which has to be justified by itself. As a problem
of logical critic, the question of the vindication of arguments “is not a
question of whether the mind approves it or not, but is a question of fact”
(EP 2:252). Peirce’s account of the relationship between logic and esthet-
ics is thus more a question of methodeutic, insofar as it looks at the course
of reasoning in its relationship to the purposed ideal. As a consequence,
in distinction from Sigwart, Peirce uses feelings to grasp an ideal that
stimulates the development of ulterior reasonings, not to establish an
ultimate inexplicable ground of logicality. In other words, if reasonable
feelings can help us in understanding the teleological movement of our
thought, they cannot be used as an argument to prove its truthfulness.40
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The function of esthetics in the context of our synthetic reasoning is
thus to guide it, providing it an end to approach. In this imaginative
grasp of reasonableness I think we can find another similarity with
Kant on the grounds of the idea of purposefulness. In the 2nd Appendix
of the first Critique (KrV, A 643–668 B 671–696) Kant presents a reg-
ulative character of the ideas of reason that enable us to organize our a
posteriori experience in a systematic way. The ideas of reason give us a
positive scheme of a systematic whole which however can be fulfilled in
a multitude of different manners. This means that the regulative ideas
provide us an indeterminate principle for the rational organization of
our knowledge (KrV, A 680 B 708). We tend to give the most system-
atic account of our thought as possible, and in so doing we follow an
indeterminate idea of what is a holistic whole for us.41 It is precisely this
tendency toward an end as a harmonic whole vaguely grasped that
Peirce described with the orientation toward an admirable state antici-
pated indeterminately in esthetics.42
But Peirce, identifying the admirable at the level of the qualitative
state of representation, provided us a stronger basis for the indetermi-
nate and vague way in which this ideal works. Having seen above how
fertile is the imaginative territory that lies between our passive appre-
hension and our active lawfulness for Peirce, we can understand the
power that the ideal gains working at this level, taking advantage of the
qualitative correlation between firstness and thirdness. As a result, we
can summarize Peirce’s account of the growth of knowledge as follows:
we have an indeterminate, undeveloped, grasping of the form of third-
ness that we must try to reach in our determinate knowledge. It hap-
pens that an occurrence captures our attention and asks for an
explanation. At this point, we give rise to a process of thought which
makes our previous habits of judgment and the present facts at hand
play in respect to their qualitative form. We let these forms play until
they reach an organization which is able, by similarity, to satisfy the
requirements of the vague, indeterminate form of our ideal.
The Regulative Hopes and the Principle of Purposiveness
Thus, when we carry through the synthetic process of reasoning we
attempt to actualize the form of an ideal, grasped vaguely at the level of
non-propositional thought, in the structure of our historically bounded
knowledge. The positive use of this ideal for the orientation of our
inquiry is made possible by a fecund “play” between thirdness and first-
ness which can bring about an always new arrangement of the form of
our thoughts in order to satisfy the required form of our ideal.
But we have no certainty that the order found thanks to our reason-
ing will account for experience. We cannot know if the ideal that governs
our thought will order it in accordance with the order of the world. Thus,
to pursue our ideal in the attempt to give an account of our experience,
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we have to hope that, following it, we can always find a habit of thought,
a law, a concept, suitable for that experience: “Every attempt to under-
stand anything,—every research,—supposes, or at least hopes, that the
very object of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identi-
cal with that which we employ” (RLT 257).
This, for Kant, is precisely what we need to judge upon an experi-
ence for which we do not know if we have a rule to judge it. We have to
reflect upon this experience as if it had the same form of our under-
standing, as if it were the purposive product of a divine mind which cre-
ated it in behalf of our knowledge.43 Here, it is useful to recall the
words of Kant: “The principle of reflection on given objects of nature
is that for all things in nature empirically determinate concepts can be
found, which is to say the same as that in all of its products one can
always presuppose a form that is possible for general laws cognizable by
us” (EE, 15–16).
Thus, both for Peirce and Kant we have to approach the inquiry
into nature as if it had the same form of the laws of our thought. In
other words, we cannot know if our inferences will lead us to a result
suitable to account for our experience, but to infer we have to hope that
this is possible.44 This is the most thorough way in which Peirce inher-
its the Kantian principle of purposiveness, as a principle that enables us
to develop concepts in order to understand the world we live. It is only
on the hypothesis of a conformity between the world and the purpose-
ful form of our thought that we can hope for a successful result of our
inferences. 
There is an important issue to stress here. Peirce holds the principle
of hope in contrast to the transcendental way of argumentation, while
the principle of purposiveness is, for Kant, a transcendental principle. 
I am not one of those transcendental apothecaries . . . who call for a
quantity of big admission, as indispensable Voraussetzungen of
logic. . . . I do not admit that indispensability is any ground of
belief. . . . But all that logic warrants is a hope, and not a belief. It
must be admitted, however, that such hopes play a considerable part
in logic. For example, when we discuss a vexed question, we hope
that there is some ascertainable truth about it, and that the discus-
sion is not to go on forever and to no purpose. A transcendentalist
would claim that it is an indispensable “presupposition” that there is
an ascertainable true answer to every intelligible question. I used to
talk like that, myself; for when I was a babe in philosophy my bottle
was filled from the udders of Kant. But by this time I have come to
want something more substantial. [CP 2.113]
Here Peirce, in criticizing the transcendental account of indispens-
ability, is touching on a similar point he made in his 1892 paper “The
Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” where he attacked the thesis that the
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absolute order of the world is a presupposition of science, a necessary
postulate. Peirce criticized this position because what is postulated
gains a positive function in the content of the inference based upon it.
In a postulate we assume as a premise something that is not certain, and
we draw from that premise some conclusion, so that the content of the
conclusion is directly affected by the postulated premise (EP 1:300–
302). Similarly, for Peirce, the transcendentalists take the necessity to
hope in the intelligibility of the world as a sufficient ground to believe
in this intelligibility.
But, for Kant, the transcendental principle of purposiveness is only
a principle to reflect upon nature as if it were produced in behalf of our
knowledge. It does not give us any ground to believe in the reality of
this principle, but it gives us only a guide for the research into nature.
Indeed, for Kant, using this principle we do not put any determinate
content into the results that we reach thanks to it.45 Thus, in spite of the
different terminology, we can see how far the similarity between the
two goes.
Peirce’s Conjunction of Esthetic Ideal and Regulative Hopes
We can now have an overall idea of the purposeful character of syn-
thetic thought for Peirce. Experience surprises us continuously forcing
us to manipulate the complex of our habits to find the simpler expla-
nation as possible. In this process of manipulation we tend toward an
ideal form of explanation grasped vaguely in imagination. Moreover,
we cannot but hope that this course of reasoning will lead us toward a
harmonic whole including thought and world. In the context of a
description of what would be the ultimate aim of action Peirce gives us
a synopsis which represents very well his idea of the course and the
requirements of thought.
It is plain that these two conditions can be fulfilled at once only if it
happens that the esthetic quality toward which the agent’s free devel-
opment tends and that of the ultimate action of experience upon him
are parts of one esthetic total. Whether or not this is really so, is a
metaphysical question which it does not fall within the scope of nor-
mative science to answer. If it is not so, the aim is essentially unat-
tainable. But just as in playing a hand of whist, when only three tricks
remain to be played, the rule is to assume that the cards are so dis-
tributed that the odd trick can be made, so the rule of ethics will be
to adhere to the only possible absolute aim, and to hope that it will
prove attainable. [EP 2:203]46
This quotation comes from a discussion of ethics. This circumstance
notwithstanding, I think it can give us a good illustration of how the
semiotic process of thought grows, considering the common normative
character of logic and ethics. This hoped tendency toward a final state
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of knowledge, resting always on the test of experience, best describes
Peirce’s idea of the growth of signs. If we have to rearrange the system
of our sign in order to account for our experience, we cannot but fol-
low the vague idea of an organized whole that we find vaguely in esthet-
ics. At the same time we have no certainty that a reasoning so developed
will lead us to a satisfying explanation of the world. Thus, we have to
hope that the process of thought-growing will develop an always more
harmonic relationship between knowledge and experience, in which
the surprising occurrences are reduced to the minimum. 
Accordingly, it is evident how purposefulness, as a regulative key
concept to understand the process of generalization that characterizes
all of our signs, and purposiveness, as a hope in the conformity between
thought and world, are important for Peirce. I think that the categories
are “empty” outside this semiotic process,47 as far as they can be recog-
nized as essential character of every phenomenon only prescinding
them from it. They appear, phenomenologically, before our eyes when
we look at the semiotic structure of our experience without identifying
any particular course of thought, searching to identify the essential
characteristics of it.48 So, we cannot have any idea of the categories, as
characters of all phenomena, without the use of examples (W 5:297–
298, 303). They are discovered as “tones of thought.”49 Then, it is clear
how the categories need an instantiation to achieve any positive con-
tent. They are necessary in character but in so vague a manner that they
gain determination only when actualized in a particular course of
thought. 
If the categories can gain determination only in their instantiations,
the value of purposefulness for Peirce’s thought is far greater than for
Kant’s. It is only as instruments, as characters, in a process oriented
toward an end that they can achieve a positive shape. Thus, the cate-
gories can be grasped only in their historical embodiment, in a way that
suggests a Hegelian idea of them. And this is not at all a wrong sugges-
tion. But what is important to notice here is that the growth of reason-
ableness, for Peirce, is not a necessary process brought about by the
dialectical movement of thought and nature, but is a regulative process,
not at all necessary, to approach an ideal state of knowledge. As a result,
Peirce, in developing further than Kant the regulative character of
thought, preserves his spirit.
The Transcendental Character of the Regulative Ideal
I believe that the purposeful picture of thought delineated here enables
us to identify a new way to individuate a transcendental level in Peirce’s
semeiotic. In this section I will discuss a criticism brought against Apel’s
transcendental interpretation of Peirce in order to show how my
account can avoid the problems of his understanding, offering a new
way to develop a transcendental interpretation of Peirce. 
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I want to state in advance that my use of the word transcendental is
more sympathetic with Kant’s own use than with contemporary analysis
of transcendental arguments in general. Since Strawson’s interpretation of
the first Critique appeared,50 there has been a large debate concerning
this subject. In this debate it has been assumed that Kant’s transcenden-
tal arguments served the need to secure the objectivity of our knowledge
against the skeptical doubt.51 Among others, Henry Allison has noticed
how this interpretation is strongly defective.52 According to him, Kant
did not try to vindicate how the ideas within our mind could be appli-
cable to an external object, but wanted to show which principles were
necessary to account for our knowledge of that object.53 If this were true,
Kant’s project would not be oriented toward the justification of an expe-
rience in question, but would be interested chiefly in the structure of our
knowledge. In this light, we can understand why Kant uses the term
“transcendental” even for regulative principles. As a matter of fact, regu-
lative principles cannot guarantee any objectivity. They are nonetheless
transcendental insofar as they are necessary for our experience and
knowledge. As far as, in my view, Peirce’s esthetic ideal and regulative
hopes are necessary regulative principles for the development of our
knowledge, they can be seen as transcendental, even if they cannot claim
any objective value. There are obviously many divergences between
Peirce and Kant in this respect. One of these lies surely in the fact that
Peirce does not allow any determinate a priori proposition on the object.
However, as far as these differences are widely accepted and recognized,
I will direct my attention to their similarities.
In a 1994 paper, Cheryl Misak showed correctly many weaknesses
in Apel’s and Habermas’ transcendental account of the semiotic
process. In particular she claimed that the assumed self-evident propo-
sitions of Apel are not so self-evident. The propositions in question
assert that (1) whenever we argue, in principle, we have to expect a pos-
sible consensus regarding what we assert, and that (2) we are obliged, in
principle, to recognize all possible members of the community of argu-
mentation as having equal rights. Misak criticizes Apel’s assumptions
saying that we must transcendentally presuppose the first proposition
only if we identify truth with what is intersubjectively valid. If we do
not do this, we can assert something, believing in its truth, without
expecting any possible consensus upon it. At the same time, experience
gives us examples which contradict the second proposition, as far as
there are people who think that only a restricted group of humans has
the same right to participate to the discourse.54 I think that the criti-
cisms put forth by Misak are fundamentally right, but I think also that
they undermine only the transcendental argument of Apel, not every
possible way to find a transcendental element in Peirce’s thought.
We can avoid the difficulties of Apel’s transcendentalism if we do not
look at the reference to the unlimited community as the ground for
T
he Purposefulness in our T
hought: a K
antian A
id to U
nderstanding Som
e E
ssential Features
•
G
abriele G
ava
717
every course of argumentation. Even if Apel speaks about the ideal
agreement as a regulative idea, in point of fact, he substantializes this
idea,55 insofar as he treats the real possibility of reaching this final state
as the ground upon which to develop a transcendental deduction. It is
true that the process of generalization of our thought tends to develop
an intersubjective and unlimited idea of truth, but such an idea is not
actually present in every process of generalization. As Misak has noted,
we can have truth claims the value of which is restricted to a limited
community, as, for example, in an anti-Semitic community. But what is
present in the semiotic law which governs the anti-Semitic community
as well is the tendency of giving a systematic account of the world. They
experience some problems in their society and try to give an explanation
with an annexed solution. The semiotic process is here oriented toward
a harmonic whole capable of accounting for experience. Then, while we
can see a process of generalization already present in this community, we
cannot identify the ultimate opinion as a “necessary postulate of semei-
otic logic.”56 The fact that we can criticize this method of fixing belief as
inadequate lies in its deficiency in the long run, in its impossibility to
resolve the problems it might face, in its inadequacy to develop an
always more congruent relationship to the world. In other words, we can
criticize it only because it fails to lead us toward a systematic whole more
and more in harmony with our experience.
Accordingly, the generalizing tendency is, for Peirce, present in every
process of signs involving knowledge. It is guided by the actualization
of the esthetic ideal that we grasp vaguely. To satisfy concretely this
ideal, we must find a system of signs that gives us the more coherent
and simple account of experience as possible, making, at the same time,
experience less surprising. It is at the level of this generalizing tendency,
in which no reference to an unlimited community is present, that we
can find a transcendental moment in Peirce: a transcendental moment
which grounds the possibility of a reference to an unlimited commu-
nity as well, as far as the unlimited community is the best way to
embody the orientation toward a harmonic whole.57 In other words,
the tendency to consider every argument as having the same right,
grows up naturally when different systems of signs confront each other.
But this is not a reference immediately present in every system of signs,
though we can find always the tendency toward a harmonic whole. 
Thus, we have to look for a systematic organization of our thought,
and we have to hope that it is capable of being in harmony with our
experience. I think it is clear how this hoped for harmony is not some-
thing that we find in experience, but something that we search for in it,
something that we need in order to have a coherent experience as a
result. This is to say that it is a necessary component of our attempt to
give an account of the world that grounds the possibility to attain an
organized experience.58 We can find this tendency even in the limited
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systems of signs, as, for example, the anti-Semitic discourse. And it is
precisely their limitation of this principle of generalization that gives us
the possibility to criticize them. There are two points to notice here.
First, the overall presence of this principle in the organization of our
signs of knowledge gives us the right to call it a transcendental princi-
ple, as far as it will be present even in the sign system that wants to crit-
icize it. We can call it a transcendental principle because it necessarily
grounds the possibility of every organization of our signs in order to
obtain knowledge of the world.59 As we have seen, Apel’s account of the
unlimited community does not answer this requirement, as far as we
have organized systems of signs which do not make any reference to the
ultimate agreement. Second, we can see in how many ways this princi-
ple can be fulfilled, due to its vague and regulative character. We can
arrange different and antagonist systems of signs following it, while the
antagonism might be a stimulus to revise all of them. Furthermore, we
have no certainty in attempting to satisfy our need of a whole; we can
always fail in this undertaking. 
All this brings us back to Kant and to the transcendental character
of the regulative principles. When he describes either the regulative
ideas of reason or the principle of the power of judgment, Kant charac-
terizes them as principles for research into nature, and not as principles
for the knowledge of nature (KU, pp. 71–73). This means that even if
it is necessary for us to use these principles, we cannot individuate them
as a priori components of the world that we experience.60 With this
account of the transcendental we avoid Peirce’s polemic description of
the transcendental philosophy as equating indispensability and truth,
and at the same time we satisfy his demand of a generalizing tendency
present in all the systems of signs involving knowledge. We can thus
find a possible new way to identify a transcendental level in our
thought in the path that has led us from Kant’s regulative ideas and
principle of the power of judgment to Peirce’s esthetic ideal and regula-
tive hopes. This transcendental level is nothing more than a guide for
the continuous rearrangement of our signs in order to account for our
experience. As such, although being necessary, it has no actuality out-
side of a determinate, historical, course of thought. 
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NOTES
1. This paper has been written during a period I spent at Penn State University
as a visiting scholar. I want to thank Professor Vincent Colapietro for his friendly
welcome in State College and for his helpful comments without which this paper
would not be as it is. Although we surely disagree on important topics concerning
the interpretation of Peirce, he was nonetheless always willing to help me in
strengthening and improving my argument. I also want to express my gratitude to
Professor Alfredo Ferrarin for his very careful reading of the manuscript and his
T
he Purposefulness in our T
hought: a K
antian A
id to U
nderstanding Som
e E
ssential Features
•
G
abriele G
ava
721
valuable suggestions. I cannot but acknowledge also my debt to Tom Viaene,
Masato Ishida and Daniel Brunson for their insightful comments. Last but not
least, I want to thank Professor Randal Dipert, Professor Douglas Anderson, and
the two anonymous referees of the Transactions for their observations.
2. In accordance with the customs of Peirce scholarship, I will refer to Peirce’s
texts using the following abbreviations. CP v.p refers to The Collected Papers of
Charles Sanders Peirce; v indicates volume number, p paragraph number. EP v:p
refers to The Essential Peirce; v indicates volume number, p page number. W v:p
refers to Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition; v indicates volume
number, p page number. RLT refers to Reasoning and the Logic of Things. MS n.p
refers to an original manuscript; n indicates manuscript number, p page number.
3. An example is represented by the last book of T. L. Short (2007), whose
interpretation of Peirce’s late semeiotic is substantially purposeful and connected
to the idea of final causation analyzed in the theory of natural classes (p. 92, chap.
4–6). Short, however, does not consider the teleology in Peirce’s cosmology. More-
over, in reference to the architectonic, even if he notices its fundamental teleolog-
ical character (pp. 61–66), he does not see it as an expression of the purposive and
normative nature of semeiotic. For a general analysis of the concept of purpose in
the context of pragmatism see: Smith, 1978.
4. “For one who had learned philosophy out of Kant, as the writer. . . had done
. . . praktisch and pragmatisch were as far apart the two poles, the former belonging
in a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make
sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite
human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its
recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational
purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the preference for the
name pragmatism” (EP 2:332–333).
5. The Kantian distinction which Peirce is referring to is at A 805–806, 823–
24 B 833–34, 851–52. It is worth noticing that Kant is here discussing contingent
purposes and not the transcendental principle of purposiveness. However, to
understand the purposefulness involved in Peirce’s approach to thought we deal
constantly with the necessary orientation toward an end. As a consequence, in
what follows in this paper, when I connect Peirce to Kant I do not mean the rela-
tionship to particular purposes, but the essential, and, as we will see, transcenden-
tal, purposefulness involved in the semiotic process.
6. Even a look to the description of purposefulness offered us by Aristotle and
Hegel is fruitful to clarify some aspects of Peirce’s thought, but I think that Kant’s
account is more enlightening for its regulative character. 
7. See for example: Apel, 1981, pp. 50, 146; Cooke, 2005, p. 657; Eco, 1999,
chap. 2; Hookway, 1985, pp. 61–63; 2000, pp. 234–235; Kaag, 2005. 
8. So, in order to be consistent, I will use the adjective purposeful when dis-
cussing teleological tendencies in thought, even if Peirce often prefers to use the
adjective purposive. Accordingly, so as to prevent misunderstanding, I have
avoided quoting those passages in which Peirce adopts the latter usage, even if I
think that their content agrees with my interpretation.
9. I refer to a methodological root insofar as I think that the principles which
I will analyze in this paper are mostly relevant for Peirce’s methodeutic, i.e. that
department of semeiotic which studies signs from the standpoint of their devel-
opment in processes of interpretation. 
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10. I will use the spelling esthetics and esthetic when I am referring to Peirce’s
particular treatment of the matter and the spelling aesthetics and aesthetic when I
am not. 
11. You can find an exception in Apel, 1981, pp. 132–133.
12. See for example: Parker, 1998.
13. Kant’s corresponding words are the followings: “The whole is thus an
organized unity (articulation), and not an aggregate (coacervatio). It may grow
from within (per intususceptionem), but not by external addition (per apposi-
tionem)” (KrV, A 833 B 861).
14. In the chapter on the architectonic of the first Critique, Kant suggests how
the architectonic system of philosophy has to be built following its conceptus cos-
micus. He says “on this view, philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowl-
edge to the essential ends of human reason” (KrV, A 838–9 B 866–7).
15. Following our definitions, Kant’s architectonic is thus a matter of pur-
posefulness.
16. Certainly, Peirce’s architectonic could also be seen as totally opposed to
that of Kant, due to his aiming at a complete classification of the sciences, includ-
ing even the empirical ones. Conversely, Kant’s focus is only on the a priori struc-
ture of reason. So, it is true that the objects that Peirce’s and Kant’s architectonics
want to organize are different. However, what I would like to shed light on are the
principles that must guide the different processes of organization, which seems to
me similar in Peirce and Kant.
17. I will refer to Peirce’s doctrine of signs as semeiotic and to the effective use
of signs as semiosis or using the adjective semiotic.
18. This is precisely what Vincent G. Potter does in his book on the normative
sciences (1967, pp. 71, 187).
19. For a discussion of this problem see: Apel, 1995; Hookway, 1995.
20. For an account of Peirce’s concept of natural classification and its relation-
ship with final causation see: Hulswit, 1994; Pape, 1993; Short, 1981.
21. If my interpretation departs from semiotic purposefulness to understand
our use of teleological concepts in natural classes, that of T. L. Short departs from
natural classes to understand semiosis as a development of the teleology in nature.
For that reason he would not follow me in distinguishing a heuristic and a real
level in the consideration of natural classes (T. L. Short, 2007, chap. 4–5).
22. See: “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic” (1869), EP 1:56–82; “The
Doctrine of Chance” (1878), EP 1:142–154.
23. See the sixth of the Harvard Lectures (1903), EP 2:216–218, and “An
Essay Toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and in Uberty” (1913), EP
2:463–474.
24. Following Peirce’s usage, I will use the term feeling to indicate non-sym-
bolical apprehension. So, in order to make straightforward the comparison with
the American thinker, I will use the term in this way even when discussing Kant.
However, this could produce confusion concerning Kant’s philosophy insofar as,
in the third Critique, the word feeling refers mainly to the feeling of pleasure and
displeasure as one of the faculties of the mind. So, it must be kept in mind that
even when I am referring to that text I am intending the former meaning.
25. It is useful to notice here that Kant’s power of judgment accounts for the
process of the production of a judgment. So, what is at issue is not the resulting
judgment, but the process that makes it possible. The different use of terminology
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notwithstanding, what interests Kant is thus very close to the Peircean idea that
our first concern must be the inference, as the process of thought, and not the
judgment, as a step in this process.
26. Jeffrey Barnouw (1988) shows correctly how Schiller criticizes Kant’s pure
formalism in ethics. However, he is totally wrong when he does not see how Kant’s
account of aesthetic judgments lays the foundation of the argument of Schiller
and how similar is the problem that both of them are facing. Probably for that rea-
son he gives us a reductionistic account of the aesthetic state speaking of “disposi-
tions to respond” (1994, p. 161).
27. This interpretation seems particularly suitable if we read a note written by
Peirce in his only paper on Schiller: “the two impulses can, and must be, balanced,
because, since the function of the formal impulse (and, as it seems to me, the
peculiar business of mortals) is to reduce to form matter which is furnished by the
sensuous impulse for no other purpose, the preponderance of either would give a
surplus of faculty which would be either unemployable or of no ultimate advan-
tage” (W 1:534).
28. For an analysis of the centrality of Kant’s reflecting power of judgment in
the overall context of his work see: La Rocca, 1999; Nuzzo, 2005.
29. Kant says that the maxims of the power of judgment “are laid down a pri-
ori as the basis for research into nature” (KU, p. 69).
30. “The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the par-
ticular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle the
law) is given, than the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it
. . . is determining. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the univer-
sal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting” (KU, 66–67). 
31. The qualitative element present in representations concerning facts can be
compared with a rule through similarity as far as Peirce’s notion of rule involves
the conception of the possible practical effects, the habits, that the truth of the
rule would imply. This means that we need a general schema of the practical appli-
cation of the rule. Imaginative representations can be confronted with these
schemata, as far as they share the same non-propositional form.
32. As a consequence of his synechism, the doctrine of the continuum, it is eas-
ier for Peirce to find a path for the access of our concepts in our feelings. For him,
we cannot identify a content in our consciousness that is not a result of a synthe-
sis, that is not itself potentially divisible in more essential parts, and, at the same
time, we cannot remove an element of compulsion even in our most abstract
reflections. This means that we cannot separate absolutely our passivity from our
activity, as far as both are always present at every level of thought. 
33. For an analysis of Peirce’s concept of self-control see: Colapietro, 1989,
Chap. 5; Petry, 1994. 
34. For an analysis of Peirce’s esthetics in the context of the normative sciences
see: Kent, 1976; Potter, 1967, chap. 2; Robin, 1964.
35. This is, for example, the position of Barnouw (1988, 1994) and Potter
(1967, pp.50–51). It does not seem plausible, as far as in a probably contempo-
rary manuscript Peirce still identifies the aim of esthetics with the individuation of
what is intrinsically fine and noble (MS 602.9–11).
36. It is true that especially in the early writing on esthetics Peirce assert that
in the pure state of esthetic enjoyment we have no consideration of the conform-
ity to an ideal of beauty (MS 310.11–12). But I think that there we have two
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 questions at hand. The first is the individuation of the ideal of beauty, the
admirable in itself, the beau, the Kalos, in which we have to avoid any reference to
any consideration. The second is the experience of beauty in objects. We cannot
experience the ideal in itself in objects, but only conformity to the ideal of reason. 
37. At this point, in order to reach a proper understanding of what is at issue,
we have to clarify what Peirce means by feeling, as far as he uses a different notion
than Kant. First of all it is important to notice that, for Peirce, we do not have a
manifoldness of feelings as our first impressions. To the contrary, the immediate-
ness of feeling presents itself in a continuous flow in which there are no parts (W
5:299, 304). Anyway, we cannot reach any representation of feeling at this level,
insofar as representing involves a process of mediation. We can only infer the pres-
ence of this flow of feelings from the qualitative component present in the semi-
otic process. In other words, we can speak about feelings only because we
represent them by means of a sign. Thus, when Peirce is referring to feelings in this
context, I think it is better to read him as referring to our representations of feel-
ings, that is, to iconic signs. Looking at our qualitative and symbolic representa-
tions as two different instantiations of signs, Peirce gives us a stronger basis for the
possibility of a comparison between the two than Kant, with his absolute division.
Notwithstanding the common ground between these two kinds of representation,
he is able to maintain a distinction between a qualitative, imaginative,  non-
conventional, representation and an habitual, ruled one, recognizing the different
roles that they play in the process of thought.
38. In a beautiful paper on Peirce’s esthetic ideal, Hausman touches on a sim-
ilar point when he holds that the esthetic value allows a qualitative anticipation of
the Summum Bonum as the end of Inquiry (1979, p. 212).
39. Potter notices correctly how, for Peirce, something is not reasonable as far
as it is pleasurable, but something is pleasurable as far as it is reasonable (1967, p.
44).
40. This means that we have another alternative to describe the ultimate end
in addition to the two indicated by Beverly Kent. We are not compelled to choose
between a grounding of logic upon feelings in Sigwarts’ way and a deliberately
achieved ideal not obtained by means of feelings (Kent 1976, pp. 270–1, 279).
We can have an indeterminate representation of the ideal grasped at the level of
feelings that is neither an irrational founding of our thought, nor a deliberative,
determined result. If it is true that the ideal can develop itself in the process of
deliberation this does not mean that it is a result of deliberation (EP 2:377–78
notwithstanding). We have to remember that the ideal has to explain why the
course of deliberation takes one way instead of another. In other words we cannot
use a result of deliberation to explain how we obtain deliberative results. What I
just said does not prevent the historical evolution of the ideal, as long as we main-
tain separate the two levels to which undetermined ideal and determined course of
deliberation depend. That is to say that we can always have different historical way
to satisfy the end, to interpret it. 
41. Following our definitions, I think that the regulative ideas are more a mat-
ter of purposefulness, even if Kant connects them with purposiveness in the 2nd
Appendix of the first Critique (KrV, A 686, B 714). This discussion is thus help-
ing us to clarify a distinction useful to understand the German thinker as well.
42. Peter Salabert (1994, p. 192) suggests an analogy between Peirce’s
admirable and Kant’s aesthetic ideas. I think the suggestion is likely, given the
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imaginative character of the aesthetic ideas. But I think that a comparison with the
regulative ideas is more fruitful for their power to orient inquiry. 
43. Here lies an important difference between Peirce’s and Kant’s idea of pur-
posiveness. For Peirce we have to hope that our purposes are the same of nature,
for Kant we have to judge as if nature is the purposive product of god. This dif-
ference notwithstanding, both need a principle that can guide us in the conceptu-
alization of our experience.
44. Contrasting those commentators who hold that Peirce’s hopes depart from
the weakness of Kant’s as if (Apel, 1981, p. 50; Hookway, 2000, p. 235; Cooke,
2005, pp. 656–657), it is Peirce himself who, in this passage written in 1885, uses
the as if terminology to introduce something very similar to his regulative hopes:
“In that way, if we think that some questions are never going to get settled, we
ought to admit that our conception of nature as absolutely real is only partially
correct. Still, we shall have to be governed by it practically; because there is noth-
ing to distinguish the unanswerable questions from the answerable ones, so that
investigation will have to proceed as if [italics mine] all were answerable” (EP
1:236). Moreover, Peirce’s hope seems to be necessary as much as Kant’s as if. Peirce
stresses: “Underlying all such principles there is a fundamental and primary
abduction, a hypothesis which we must [italics mine] embrace at the outset, how-
ever destitute of evidentiary support it may be. That hypothesis is that the facts in
hand admit of rationalization, and of rationalization by us. That we must [italics
mine] hope they do, for the same reason that a general who has to capture a posi-
tion, or see his country ruined, must go on the hypothesis that there is some way
in which he can and shall capture it” (EP 2:106–107).
45. “Now this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a
concept of nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to the
object (of nature), but rather only represent the unique way in which we must
proceed in reflection on the object of nature with the aim of a thoroughly inter-
connected experience” (KU, p. 71). Hookway does not seem to acknowledge this
characterization of the transcendental when he uses the argument of Peirce to
avoid any transcendentalism in the Peircean view of hopes (1995, p. 401–403). 
46. We can find a clue that what Peirce has in mind is very close to the Kant-
ian idea of regulative principles in a draft for the third Lowell Lectures of 1903 in
which, describing the Kantian notion of regulative principle, Peirce used the same
example of the hand of whist (MS 462.42–43).
47. See Hausman (1979, pp. 213–214) for a similar account.
48. Obviously, here I am considering only the phenomenological description
of the categories as characters of every phenomenon, not the mathematical
grounding of them.
49. For an analysis of how the categories cannot but be derived from the semi-
otic process see: Colapietro, 2001.
50. Strawson, 1966.
51. See for example: Stroud, 1968, 1994.
52. Allison, 1983. See also: Bird, 2006.
53. It is true that Kant provided an argument against the skeptic in his Refuta-
tion of Idealism. However, it is also true that this is absolutely not the first concern
of his project, but merely an argument to undermine Descartes’ position (Allison,
1983, pp. 294–309). See also: Carl, 2006, pp. 186–7.
54. Misak, 1994, pp. 752–753.
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55. See Oehler, 1987, p. 50.
56. Apel, 1995, p. 385.
57. In a similar way Cooke (2005, p. 659–662) suggests the possibility to find
a transcendental level in Peirce’s thought different from that of Apel.
58. We cannot say that it grounds our experience because it is not a constitu-
tive principle. As a regulative one it remains a fallible and hypothetic principle that
grounds only our looking for knowledge without any certainty to obtain it. This
fallibility notwithstanding, I think that we have to look at Peirce’s admirable as
something that enables us to come to grips with our experience, but that is not
known in experience.
59. I agree with T. L. Short when he holds that the purposive character of the
sign relationship resides in the process of interpretation. We always interpret for a
purpose (Short, 2007, pp. 158, 171–72). I would add to the position of Short that
when in the process of interpretation is involved a production of knowledge (and
this is the case for the most part of our signs) we do not deal only with particular
purposes, but also with general ones: knowledge always involving the search for a
coherent and congruent understanding. Perhaps the difference between my tran-
scendental and his naturalistic account of purposefulness lies in this addition. This
is confirmed by the “antifoundationalist” reading of “The Fixation of Belief ”
offered by Short (2000). He develops a suggestive hypothesis claiming that in this
paper we have not only an exposition of different methods, but even of different
aims, concluding that there is not a fundamental aim for Peirce. I think, though,
that this reading cannot explain the whole of semeiosis as a normative process, as
far as it can identify a normative character in each method, linked to its particular
aim, but not a normative character in the movement from one aim to the other,
this movement depending on the introduction of a new condition under consid-
eration. If this movement has to be understood as a normative process we must
ask: under what principle do we consider preferable a change of aim? This ques-
tion cannot but be answered identifying a more fundamental aim. 
60. As a consequence we cannot speak, like Apel (1981, pp. 84–85, 119), of a
transcendental deduction in Peirce. For Kant a transcendental deduction vindi-
cates the use of some concepts as far as constitutive of nature. Kant never speaks
of a transcendental deduction when he treats the regulative principles for the
research into nature. He undertakes a transcendental deduction of the judgments
of taste, but only as far as no knowledge is involved in them.
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